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Publicly, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) tends to be associated with
the creation of a military component of the EU. Yet the first operation within the
framework of the ESDP is being executed using exclusively civilian means ￿ through
the European Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina since January 2003. On
31 March 2003, the EU took over the military mission Allied Harmony (now called
Concordia) in Macedonia, and from 2004 on, this could also be the case with SFOR. With
the ESDP, Europe has set itself the goal of ￿a balanced parallel development of military
and civilian capabilities,￿ in order to bolster Europe￿s influence in international crisis
management. Meanwhile, the civilian component of the ESDP is not just less well-
known, but so far, it is also significantly underdeveloped. The European police force
may represent a beginning, but further non-military instruments must also be deploy-
able if a broad civilian-military approach is to become a trademark of future EU
security policy.
The EU is gearing up to be better prepared
for crisis situations, and to be able to
participate in international stabilisation
missions with the whole spectrum of its
capabilities. Until now, the Union has
employed traditional economic, financial
and diplomatic channels in order to bring
its weight to bear in crisis management.
Since 1999, specific intervention instru-
ments have been developed in the frame-
work of the ESDP: a task force comprising
60,000 soldiers, including the necessary
infrastructure, and some civilian instru-
ments, for instance police personnel and
experts in the rule of law, civilian adminis-
tration and civil protection. Though these
capacities will remain with the member
states for the time being, they are prepared
in Brussels for deployment under the com-
mand of the EU. In the Council of Ministers,
additional committees have been estab-
lished, and staff has been earmarked for
this by the member states.
The civilian spectrum of the ESDP
Although the ESDP has taken on its first
operative task with the EUPM, it is still in
the process of development. After the policy
resolution of Helsinki (December 1999) to
equip the ESDP with a military and a non-
military component, four priority areas
were settled on at the European Council in
Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000), in which
in the EU intends to charge civilian capaci-
ties for deployment in crisis regions.SWP Comments 6
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Numerically, the planned civilian con-
tingent of the ESDP is not very impressive,
especially when compared with the size of
the military contingent. Nevertheless, the
civilian component of the ESDP is under-
rated amongst the general public and,
sometimes, in politics too. After all, it does
cover areas that can be decisive for stability
in crisis areas, and which, until now, often
had to be done by soldiers in the context of
peacekeeping measures. At the beginning
of 2003, the level of development of the
non-military component of the ESDP is as
follows:
Police.  The member states provide the EU
with 5000 police officers, of whom 1400
can be mobilised within less than 30 days.
The vast majority of these are police staff
with a civilian status. Only France, Italy,
Spain, Greece and Portugal also dispatch
paramilitary personnel, where the line
dividing them from the armed forces can
be fluid. The EU has drawn up a police-
action plan for two types of operation:
interventions to replace local police staff
are required if public order and security, as
well as criminal and civil law systems have
to be restored because the local authorities
do not function; interventions in support of
local police capacities are required if the
abilities of local police forces are to be im-
proved to conform to international norms.
Experience shows that close cooperation
with local authorities is essential.
Legal experts.  The fifteen states have com-
mitted to the EU 282 experts (including 72
judges, 48 public prosecutors, 72 prison
officers and 38 civil service staff), of whom
60 can be mobilised within 30 days, while
43 officials are to be available for investiga-
tive missions. Just as with the police staff,
the legal experts will be trained for two
types of interventions: on one hand, to re-
inforce local structures through consulting
and training; on the other, to restore the
rule of law, whereby officials are to be
entrusted with executive tasks for the time
being. An EU pilot project promotes the
networking of the national training estab-
lishments in the area of the rule of law and
civilian administration, in order to be able
to develop training modules and imple-
ment instruction.
Civilian administration.  The exact size of
the pool of experts to be set up has not yet
been laid down, since the area of civilian
administration comprises a very large field
of operation. It includes everything from
the land registry, health services and edu-
cation to waste management in a crisis
region. In this respect, open lists are first
drawn up, composed of qualified personnel
who can take on consultancy and supervi-
sion activities, as well as executive func-
tions, at short notice. During the Spanish
presidency, guidelines and fundamental
principles were compiled for the deploy-
ment of the experts. The Danish presidency
has appealed to the member states to ear-
mark appropriate administration experts.
Civil protection.  There are three obvious
fields of activity: the coordination of
refugee influxes, the protection of civilians
in the event of armed conflict or terror
attacks and assistance in the event of epi-
demics, illnesses and famine in the wake of
crisis situations. The member states have
confirmed their contributions for these
tasks to the appropriate surveillance and
coordination centre in the European Com-
mission. In the meantime, the objectives set
have been nominally reached:
! three teams of 10 experts each, who can
mobilise within 3 to 7 hours in order to
assess the necessary measures, and to en-
sure their coordination;
! 2000 experts who have been trained in
the various fields of civil protection, and
are available at short notice;
! highly specialised experts on standby
from national authorities and non-
governmental organisations.
The quality of the confirmed contin-
gents, their training and equipment, and
their ability to function as integrated
teams, remain to be assessed.SWP Comments 6
April 2003
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Overall, the state of preparedness in the
four priority areas can be described as
advanced, but not as satisfactory. If one
considers that the EU is not just preparing
for independently coordinated interven-
tions, but also for contributions to missions
implemented by the OSCE and the UN,
decisive improvements have yet to be made
to transform the planned figures into full
and adequate capabilities. At the same
time, it has not yet been taken into con-
sideration that the decision to deploy
remains dependent on the respective
national interests of the contributing
states. Experience with the first EU-led
deployments will show to what extent
the EU￿s crisis capacities will prove their
worth in practice. The progression and
the results of the EUPM and the mission
Concordia will provide important data in
this respect.
Die EUPM ￿ a test for the EU
The Council of Ministers already allocated
the assignments for the EUPM in March
2002. The preparation period until
December 2002 was needed to avoid a
power vacuum at the takeover point from
the UN￿s International Police Task Force
(IPTF). Compared to the IPTF, the EUPM has
a significantly lower number of personnel
and a slightly different mandate. It is
reduced to about one third, and only
counts around 500 police officers and a
good 300 international and local staff. Of
the 30 states to have previously dispatched
police personnel to the IPTF, 18 are still
involved. Besides the EU member states and
candidate states, Russia, Canada and
Switzerland are also participating. From
the point of view of its size and compo-
sition, the mission is manageable and, in
this respect, a suitable test for the EU￿s
leadership qualities.
EUPM personnel are answerable to the
UN￿s High Commissioner in Bosnia-Herze-
govina, the Briton Paddy Ashdown, in his
second function as the EU￿s Special Envoy.
The operative management of the mission
is delegated to the Danish Police Inspector
Sven Christian Frederiksen, whose reports
are sent to the EU foreign ministers via
Ashdown and the CFSP High Representative
Javier Solana. The EU Council of Ministers￿
Political and Security Committee retains
political control of the mission. Euro 38 m
per year, divided between the EU budget
and the contributions of the member
states, have been set aside for the period
2003 to 2005 ￿ an arrangement that took
great efforts to achieve.
In contrast to the IPTF, the EU mission
hardly deals with any executive respon-
sibilities, but is instead intended to con-
tribute to setting up a professional police in
Bosnia-Herzegovina through monitoring,
consultancy and inspection. The police is
to be prepared to deal effectively with
organised crime, human trafficking, drug
trading and corruption. The objective is to
bring about conformity with EU norms.
Overall, the task in a still tense post-war
region remains as demanding as it is dan-
gerous. For this reason, special importance
is given to the cooperation between EUPM
and SFOR.
Drawbacks of the
civilian instruments
It can generally be stated that the civilian
tasks are no less important than the mili-
tary component of the ESDP. Rather, they
complete a civilian-military continuum
that is to be developed as a particular
quality of the Union￿s security policy.
Despite the pioneering nature of the EUPM
and the mission Concordia, the ESDP can
by no means be considered sufficiently ad-
vanced. This applies both to the civilian and
the military components, which will not be
discussed in greater detail here. Compared
to the military component, progress has
been cautious in the civilian area. Further-
more, the developments cannot be de-
scribed as balanced, since the civilian
component is significantly smaller from
the point of view of personnel and material
than the military. In the end, the two com-SWP Comments 6
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ponents are not yet sufficiently prepared
for a combined deployment.
In contrast to the rather modest progress
of the ESDP, the requirement of civilian
instruments has increased worldwide. In
about half the UN peace missions currently
under way, police personnel are being
deployed alongside military personnel,
while at the same time the proportion of
civilian experts per mission is growing.
Civilian stabilisation personnel have to take
on the chief tasks in certain conflict areas,
as in the examples set in East-Timor, in
Kosovo and in Afghanistan. Depending on
the crisis situation, either the civilian
instruments complement the military,
or vice-versa. In both cases, though, the
division of tasks must be organised and per-
manently established.
As soon as experience with the current
instruments has been assessed, additional
civilian intervention reserves could become
necessary for the EU: the reintegration of
refugees, the treatment of ethnic-religious
minorities, election monitoring, the intro-
duction of independent media and disaster
relief are priority areas for such an expan-
sion of the scope of the tasks. For this, the
EU could revert to the comprehensive
catalogue from which priority areas were
already identified during the Portuguese
presidency. The following development
tasks must be included in any initiative for
a richer civilian arsenal of the EU:
! the full development of the four priority
areas already begun with,
! considering additional civilian instru-
ments in the context of the ESDP,
! setting up a management and coordi-
nation infrastructure for civilian field
deployment,
! development of civilian-military cooper-
ation, both within the EU and in the
respective regions,
! coordination of the civilian ESDP compo-
nents with the capacities of the UN, the
OSCE, NATO and the Council of Europe,
! laying down the financing for civilian
crisis management missions in the EU
budget,
! increased use of the civilian instruments
for crisis prevention.
How civilian is the ESDP? The answer to
this question has long-term implications
for the further development of EU external
action. In this sense, the European Con-
vention should address such structural
questions in greater detail. The documents
submitted so far only address the ESDP
generally, without dealing more precisely
with both its components. In the drafts of
the constitutional treaty it remains unclear
whether the ESDP is assigned to the section
of ￿crisis management￿ or to the chapter on
￿Defence￿ or both. Moreover, the category
￿conflict prevention￿ is completely missing.
Clarification of these points seems to be
required.
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